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Recent Decisions
Receipt of a Complaint, Prior to or Unattended by
Formal Service of Process, Does Not Trigger a
Defendant's Thirty-Day Period to Remove a Case:
Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,
Inc.
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE - REMOVAL OF CASES - TIME TO REMOVE
- The Supreme Court of the United States held that a named
defendant's time to remove an action from state court to federal
court, under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), is triggered by either simultaneous
service of summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint,
through service or otherwise, after and apart from service of the
summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by
any formal service of process.
Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 119 S. Ct.
1322 (1999).
On January 26, 1996, Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. ("Michetti")
filed an action in Alabama state court for breach of contract and
fraud against Murphy Brothers, Inc. ("Murphy").' Three days later,
on January 29, 1996, Michetti faxed a "courtesy copy" of the
complaint to a Murphy vice president.2 Murphy replied to Michetti,
1. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 1322, 1325-26
(1999). In its complaint, Murphy claimed that Michetti did not pay for additional work
performed pursuant to a construction contract between the parties. See Petitioner's Brief at
1, Murphy Bros. (No. 97-1909).
2. See Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1326. The complaint was sent with a cover letter to
the Murphy vice president for risk management. See Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. v. Murphy
Bros., Inc., 125 F3d 1396, 1397 (lth Cir. 1997) rev'd 119 S. Ct. at 1330 (1999).
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acknowledging receipt of the complaint. 3 On February 12, 1996,
fourteen days after receipt of the faxed courtesy copy of the
complaint, Michetti formally served Murphy under local law with a
copy of the complaint via certified mail.
4
On March 13, 1996, Murphy filed a notice of removal under 28
U.S.C. § 1441 to remove the case from state court to-federal court.5
Murphy filed the notice of removal thirty days after receipt of the
complaint through service of process under local law, but forty-four
days after receipt of the faxed courtesy copy of the complaint from
Michetti. 6 Michetti moved to remand the case to state court on the
grounds that the time period for removal to federal court had
expired.7  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) ("section 1446 (b)"), a
defendant has thirty days from the receipt of complaint, "through
service or otherwise," to remove a case from state court to federal
court.8 Michetti argued that because Murphy did not provide the
notice of removal within thirty days after receipt of the faxed
"courtesy copy" of the complaint, the removal was untimely under
section 1446(b). 9
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama denied Michetti's motion to remand the case to state court
on the grounds that the thirty-day removal period did not begin to
run until the defendant was officially served with a summons after
and apart from receipt of the complaint.'0 The United States Court
3. See Michetti Pipe Stringing, 125 F3d at 1397.
4. See Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1326. The parties were engaged in settlement
discussions prior to formal service of the complaint. Id.
5. See id. "Murphy invoked the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1332 based on diversity of citizenship. Michetti is a Canadian company with its
principal place of business in Alberta, Canada; Murphy is an Illinois corporation with its
principal place of business in that state." Id. at 1326 n.l.
6. See Michetti Pipe Stringing, 125 F3d at 1397.
7. See id.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994). This statute states in relevant part as follows:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days
after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the
initial ,pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding
is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if
such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on
the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, the statute also states that if the initial pleading does not
state a claim that is removable, the defendant has 30 days from "receipt ... through service
or otherwise," of any paper that renders the case removable. Id. "[E]xcept . . .a case may
not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by [federal diversity] more than one
year after commencement of the action." Id.
9. See Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1326.
10. See id.
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of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit heard the case on interlocutory
appeal and reversed, instructing the district court to remand the
a~ion to state court for disposition." The court of appeals held
that the thirty-day removal period began to run upon receipt of the
faxed file stamped copy of the complaint regardless of the date of
service of process.12 The court relied upon the plain meaning of the
statutory provision "within thirty days after receipt by the
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial
pleading." 3 In analyzing the statute, the court reasoned that the
word "receipt" is attached to the phrase "through service or
otherwise" and together describes the action necessary to begin the
thirty-day period for removal. 4 The court of appeals found that
limiting the interpretation of the statute to only receipt through
service of process would limit the broad meaning of the statute. 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 6 to resolve
the issue of whether a named defendant must be served with
process for the thirty-day period to begin to run, or whether "the
thirty-day period [may] start earlier, on the named defendant's
receipt, before service of official process, of a 'courtesy copy' of
the filed complaint faxed by counsel for the plaintiff."7 In the
majority opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the
Court held that "a named defendant's time to remove is triggered
by simultaneous service of summons and complaint, or receipt of
11. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 125 F3d at 1399. The motion for an order of interlocutory
appeal was allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994), which states in relevant part as
follows:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of
Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in
its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to
it within ten days after the entry of the order. provided, however, that application for
an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district
judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
12. See Michetti Pipe Stringing, 119 S. Ct. at 1396-97.
13. Id at 1397-98.
14. Id. at 1398. The plain meaning of the statute should be used in interpreting the
statute; "if a statute is clear, it means what it says." Id.
15. Id. The court felt that limiting the triggering event to strictly service of process
would violate the broad meaning of the statute, trimming the method of receipt to "a narrow
spectrum of methods." Id.
16. See Murphy Bros., Inc., v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998).
17. Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1325.
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the complaint, through service or otherwise, after and apart from
service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint
unattended by any formal service."
18
The majority relied upon three primary factors in determining
that service of process is required for the thirty-day removal period
to begin; the longstanding use of service of process as a
fundamental method of obtaining jurisdiction over a named party, 19
the lack of evidence of legislative intent to depart from this
longstanding tradition by enacting section 1446(b), 20 and the broad
language of section 1446(b) that potentially creates a limitless
scope of interpretation. 21 In summary, the Murphy Brothers
majority emphasized that in the absence of a clearer expression of
intent from Congress, the removal statute must be read as requiring
formal service of process to trigger the thirty-day removal period.
22
The first primary factor for the majority's opinion was that
"[s]ervice of process . . . is fundamental to any procedural
imposition on a named defendant."23 The Court noted that the
common law writ of capias ad respondum was the historical
precedent to contemporary service of process.24  The Court
reasoned the writ obtained in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant, allowing the royal court to secure the appearance of the
defendant by taking him into custody.25 The Court stressed that
even today, "[iun the absence of service of process (or waiver of
service by the defendant), a court ordinarily may not exercise
18. Id. at 1326. Justice Ginsburg was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, and Breyer. Id. at 1325. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, dissented. Id. at 1330 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 1326. When proceedings involve the determination of personal liability of the
defendant, under the Due Process Clause "he must be brought within the court's jurisdiction
by service of process within the state, or his voluntary appearance." Burnham v. Superior
Court of California, County of Main, 495 U.S. 604, 616 (1990) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 733 (1877)).
20. Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1327.
21. Id. at 1328.
22. Id. 1329-30.
23. Id. at 1326.
24. Id. at 1326-27 (citing International Shoe v. Wahington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). Capias
ad respondum is defined as: [a] judicial writ . . . by which actions at law were frequently
commenced; and which commands the sherriff to take the defendant, and him safely keep,
so that he may have his body before the court on a certain day, to answer the plaintiff in
the action. It notifies the defendant to defend suit and procures his arrest until security for
plaintiffs claim is furnished. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 143 (6th ed. 1991).
25. Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1326 (citing 1 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACCE 212
(2d ed 1996)).
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power over a party the complaint names as [a] defendant."
26
Service of process is the official method of providing a party with
notice of the time in which to appear and defend or be subject to a
judgment in default.
27
IRegarding the second primary factor, the lack of Congressional
intent to alter the significance of service of process, the Court
reasoned that based upon the legislative history of section 1446(b),
Congress did not .intend to permit the time period for removal to
begin prior to receipt of service of process.28 The Court found that
prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), a defendant's time
limit to remove a. case from state to federal court depended only
on the applicable state law.29 When Congress enacted the statute in
1948, a defendant could file for removal of an action "within twenty
days after commencement of the action or service of process,
whichever is later."30 However, Congress soon realized that in states
that permit service of a writ of summons to commence a civil
action, it would be possible for a defendant to have to decide to
remove a case before ever seeing a copy of the complaint.31 The
Court stated that the legislative history of the amendment that
revised the period to remove under section 1446(b) to "within
twenty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or
26. Id. at 1327. Under Article III Section 1 of the Constitution,
before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the
procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied. Thus before a court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, there must be more than notice
to the defendant and a constitutionally sufficient relationship between the defendant
and the forum. There also must be a basis for the defendant's amenability to service
of summons.
Omni Capital Int'l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 US 97, 104 (1987).
27. Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1327 (citing FED. R. Crv. P. 4(a)). "[The summons] shall
also state the time within which the defendant must appear and defend, and notify the
defendant that failure to do so will result in a judgment by default against the defendant for
the relief demanded in the complaint." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a). "Unless a different time is
prescribed in a statute of the United States, a defendant shall serve an answer within 20
days after being served with the summons and complaint." FED. R. CIrv. P 12(a)(1)(A).
28. Murphy Brothers, 119 S. Ct. at 1327. The original Congressional intent in enacting
section 1446(b) was to "reduce the disparity" of the time limit for removal of cases to federal
court from state to state. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The provision was intended to "give adequate time and operate uniformly
throughout the Federal jurisdiction." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 308 (1947)).
31. Id. Congress was correcting the "New York problem" by amending the statute; in
New York, a plaintiff could initiate a civil action by service of summons, which could
precede the defendant receiving a copy of the complaint. Id. As the statute was originally
enacted in 1948, the time period for removal could expire before defendant had even
received a copy of the complaint. Id.
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otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading" shows that the change
was made simply to address atypical state commencement and
filing procedures.32 The Court held "that there was nothing in the
legislative history" of the statute to demonstrate Congress's
intention to "dispense with the historic function of service of
process as the official trigger for responsive action by an individual
or entity named defendant."u
The third primary factor of the majority's opinion was that the
language of section 1446(b) is overly broad and could lead to a
potentially limitless scope of interpretation.3" A plain meaning
interpretation of the phrase "through service or otherwise" allows
for a "universe" of methods for placing the defendant in possession
of the complaint besides formal service of process.35 The Court
opined that requiring service of process, either before or attended
by receipt of the complaint, adheres to precedent and provides a
reasonable interpretation of the phrase "or otherwise."36 The
following are the scenarios for receipt of the complaint and service
of process under the Court's interpretation:
First, if the summons and complaint are served together, the
thirty-day period for removal runs at once. Second, if the
defendant is served with the summons but the complaint is
furnished to the defendant sometime after, the period for
removal runs from the defendant's receipt of the complaint.
Third, if the defendant is served with the summons and the
complaint is filed in court, but under local rules, service of the
complaint is not required, the removal period runs from the
date the complaint is made available through filing. Finally, if
the complaint is filed in court prior to any service, the
removal period runs from the service of summons.37
The Court held that a broad, plain language interpretation would
lead to a limitless scope of interpretation of the requirements to
begin the removal period under section 1446(b).
In summary, the Court held that in order to usurp the
long-standing requirement of service of process for a court to
32. Id. at 1327-28.
33. Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1328.
34. Id. at 1328.
35. Id. The Court remarked on a broad interpretation of the phrase "receipt through
service or otherwise": "What are the dimensions of that 'universe'?... Nor can one tenably
maintain that the words 'or otherwise' provide a clue." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1328-29 (citing Potter v. McCauley, 186 F Supp. 146, 149 (D. Md. 1960)).
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obtain jurisdiction over a named defendant, Congress must provide
a "clearer statement" of intent to change this procedural
requirement.3
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, reasoned that receipt of the faxed
"courtesy copy" of the complaint before formal service of process
was sufficient to trigger the thirty-day removal period under 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b).39 The dissenters found that the majority opinion
departed from a precedent of "strictly construing removal and
similar jurisdictional statutes."40 Chief Justice Rehnquist found no
reason to depart from the plain meaning interpretation of section
1446(b) and chastised the majority for "superimpos[ing] a judicially
created service of process requirement onto § 1446(b)."41
The concept of removing some actions from state to federal
court existed long before the current removal statute was enacted;
the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for the removal of civil and
criminal actions to federal courts.4' Pursuant to this Act, Congress
provided for the removal of state court proceedings when a federal
court could exercise jurisdiction based upon either the presence of
a federal question or the diversity of citizenship of the parties."
The constitutionality of removal under the Judiciary Act of 1789
was tested and upheld in 1871 by Chicago and Northwestern
Railway Co. v. Whitton's Administrator."
Since the recognition of a right of removal, Congress has
imposed various restrictions and limitations on this right. Until
1948 the time for removal was governed by 28 U.S.C. § 72, which
provided that a petition for removal may be filed "any time before
the defendant required by the laws of the State or the rule of the
38. Murphy Brothers, 119 S. Ct. at 1329.
39. Id. at 1330 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
40. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the case of Shamrock
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-109 (1941), as precedent for the principle of
following a strict construction of jurisdictional and removal statutes.
41. Id.
42. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1994).
44. 80 U.S. 270 (1871). In this case, the husband of his deceased wife, as administrator
for her estate, brought a negligence action against the railway company in Wisconsin state
court. Id. at 273-74. The husband and his late wife were residents of Illinois and the railway
was incorporated under the laws of Wisconsin. Id. While the case was pending in state court,
Congress amended the removal act to allow for removal of certain cases from state court to
federal court, including cases where federal court jurisdiction could be based on diversity of
the parties. Id. at 272. The Supreme Court upheld the removal of cases from state court to
federal court based upon diversity of state citizenship. Id. at 289-90.
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State court in which such suit is brought answer or plead."45 The
replacement for this statute was 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), which
provided that "[t]he petition for removal of a civil action or
proceeding may be filed within twenty days after commencement
of the action or service of process, whichever is later."
46
The purpose of setting a precise time for removal was to provide
for equality and uniformity throughout the states for removal
actions.
47
However, the revision created problems in states such as New
York, where filing of the initial pleading was not required until after
service of summons. 48 In New York, prior to the revision, a plaintiff
could commence an action by writ of summons; therefore, the time
for the defendant to remove the action might expire prior to ever
receiving a copy of the complaint.49 In response to this difficulty, 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b) was amended in 1949 with the addition of the
phrase "within twenty days after receipt by the defendant, through
service of process or otherwise" to ensure receipt of the complaint
prior to the time for removal being triggered. 5° The statute was
then further amended to extend the period for removal from
twenty days to thirty days.
5'
The Murphy Brothers Court stated that determining the scope of
the statutory phrase "after receipt by defendant through service or
otherwise" is critical to the proper interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b).5 2 The United States District Court for the District of
Maryland was one of the first federal courts to examine this
question in Potter v. McCauley.5 On March 15, 1960, the plaintiff
sent a copy of a complaint filed the same day in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, Maryland to the defendant.5 Four months
45. See WEST'S FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND Ruins 780 (1995); 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b) (1994), Reviser's Notes.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1948).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994), Historical and Statutory Notes. The purpose of the
amendment was to "make uniform the time for filing petitions to remove all civil actions
within twenty days after commencement of action." Id.
48. 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1254, 1268.
49. Murphy Bros., 119 S.Ct. at 1327-28.
50. Id.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1955).
52. Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct.. at 1325-26. In examining the scope of the word
"otherwise" in 28 U.S.C. § 1446, the Court described the scope of interpretation of the
possible meanings of the word as a universe and questioned, "[W]hat are the dimensions of
that 'universe'?" Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1328.
53. 186 F Supp. 146 (D. Md. 1960).
54. Potter, 186 F Supp. at 147. Defendant was a resident of the District of Columbia
and plaintiff a resident of Maryland. Id.
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after receipt of the initial complaint, on June 16, 1960, defendant
filed an order of appearance and petitioned to remove the case to
the federal district court.5 On June 30, 1960, the plaintiff fied a
motion to remand the case to state court on the ground that the
removal was untimely under the statute.5 The district court
rejected the notion that to begin the period for removal under the
statute, the word "otherwise" allowed for receipt of a complaint
unattended by either service of process or voluntary appearance by
the named party.57 Relying heavily on the historical development of
the statute, the court emphasized that the language of 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b) was not meant to remove the requirement of personal
service of process to begin the period for removal.58 The district
court judge overruled the plaintiff's motion to remand the case
because the time period for removal did not begin until the
defendant was either served with process or made a voluntary
appearance to the court.59
As evidenced by the decision in Potter v. McCauley, prior to the
decision of the Court in Murphy Brothers, the federal courts were
split as to the proper interpretation of the phrase "or otherwise"
and the necessity of service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
The majority of cases, prior to the decision in Murphy Brothers,6°
followed the "receipt rule"61 embodied by the decision of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in
Tyjler v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 2 and also followed
by Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Airco Industrial Gases,6 Pochiro
v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,64 Roe v. O'Donohue,6 and
Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.6 The minority rule was "proper
service,"67 ultimately embraced by the Supreme Court in Murphy
55. Id. In her petition, defendant stated that "she desired to enter her general
appearance [in the district court] and to remove the case hereto." Id.
56. Id. at 147-48.
57. Id.
58. Id. "In the revision of the Judicial Code it was thought desirable to make the modal
provision with respect to where the petition for removal should be filed and, so far as
possible, the time within which it was filed, 'uniform'....." Id. at 148.
59. Id. at 150.
60. 119 S. Ct. 1322 (1999).
61. Kluksdahl v. Muro Pharm., Inc., 886 F Supp. 535 (E.D. Va. 1995).
62. 524 F Supp. 1211 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
63. 676 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1982).
64. 827 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1987).
65. 38 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 1994).
66. 98 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 1996).
67. Kluksdahl, 886 F. Supp. at 538.
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Brothers,6 and embodied by the decision of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Virginia in Love v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. 69 and followed by Potter v.
McCauley,7 0 Estate of Baratt v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
Co.,7 Apache Nitrogen Products, Inc. v. Harbor Insurance Co. et.
a.,72 and Bowman v. Weeks Marine, Inc. 73
In 7jler, the plaintiff instituted an action in the Court of
Common Pleas for Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, and delivered a
copy of the petition via certified mail to the defendant on March 4,
1981. 74 The defendant raised preliminary objections that were
sustained by the court on April 6, 1981. 75 After sustaining the
objections, instead of dismissing the complaint, the court
recharacterized the petition and ordered the plaintiff to comply
with the recharacterization. 76 The defendant accepted service of
process on April 10, 1981 and subsequently filed a petition to
remove the case on May 4, 1981. 77 Plaintiff moved to remand on the
grounds that the petition for removal was untimely.78
The defendant in Tyler argued that the removal period did not
commence until service of the recharacterized petition.79 The court
rejected the argument that recharacterization of the petition in
effect "reset" the clock for the removal period under 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b).80 The court held that the receipt of the "initial pleading"
controls for removal purposes irrespective of service of process
under state law.81 The court further held that all that is required as
68. 119 S. Ct. 1322 (1999).
69. 542 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga 1982).
70. 186 F Supp. 146. (D. Md. 1960).
71. 787 F Supp. 333 (W.D. N.Y 1992).
72. 145 FR.D. 674 (D. Ariz. 1993).
73. 936 F Supp. 329 (D. S.C. 1996).
74. Tyler, 524 F. Supp. at 1212. The action was instituted on March 3, 1981 and
defendant received a copy of the complaint via certified mail on March 4, 1981. Id. The
action was instituted by a petition filing for a nile to show cause why benefits under the
Pennsylvania No-Fault Insurance Act should not be paid to the plaintiff. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1212-13. The court recharacterized the rule for show of cause as a complaint
in assumpsit in the prothonotary's office and ordered a writ to be issued pursuant to the
assumpsit. Id. Assumpsit is defined as "[a] common law form of action which lies for the
recovery of damages for the non-performance of a parol or simple contract." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 81 (6th ed. 1991).
77. Id. at 1213.
78. Id.
79. Tj/er, 524 F Supp. at 1213.
80. Id. at 1213.
81. Id. (citing Perimeter Lighting, Inc. v. Karlton, 456 F Supp. 355, 359 (N.D. Ga
1978)). The court in Perimeter Lighting held that "[ain initial pleading must constitute a
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an "initial pleading" under section 1446(b) is a pleading "from
which the defendant can ascertain that the case is one which is or
has become removable."8 2 The court held that service of process
under state law does not control for removal purposes and
recharacterization of a complaint does not effect the time for
removal under section 1446(b). 83
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Airco Industrial
Gases8 was in agreement with the decision of the court in Tyler
and followed the receipt rule.8 5 On January 19, 1981, plaintiff
Northern Illinois Gas Company ("NI-Gas") filed suit in state court
naming Airco Industrial Gases ("Airco") and The American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") as defendants.86 On the same day, a
copy of the complaint was delivered to counsel for Airco, who had
been representing the company during the dispute and arbitration
proceedings.87 Airco received summons on January 23, 1981.
88
Airco unilaterally filed a removal petition on January 26, 1981,
based upon diversity of citizenship.8 9 The petition did not attempt
to explain the reason for lack of joinder or consent by AAA.9°
NI-Gas moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that Airco
had failed to join AAA in the petition or explain their absence from
the petition.9' Airco filed an amended petition on February 20, 1981,
stating that AAA was a nominal party to the complaint.92 Plaintiff
clear statement of the case which will allow the defendant to examine the basis for the
action." Perimeter Lighting, 456 F Supp. at 358.
82. Tjer, 524 F Supp. at 1213 (citing International Equity Corp. v. Pepper & Tanner
Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
83. Id. at 1212-13.
84. 676 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1982).
85. Northern lt. Gas Co., 676 F2d at 270.
86. Id. at 272.
87. Id. at 271-72. Airco had demanded arbitration for the dispute under the arbitration
clause of the contract. Id. NI-Gas instituted suit, claiming the suit was not arbitrable. Id.
88. Id. at 272.
89. Id.
90. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 676 F.2d at 272.
Because it is incumbent upon a party petitioning to remove a state court case to
federal court to allege in the petition "a short and plain statement of the facts which
entitle" him to remove, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), a petition filed by less than all of the
named defendants is considered defective if it fails to contain an explanation for the
absence of codefendants.
Id. at 273 (citing Wright v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 98 F.2d 34, 36 (8th Cir. 1938);
Heckleman v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 45 F Supp. 984, 985 (E.D. Il. 1942); Santa Clara
County v. Goldy Machine Co., 159 F. 750, 751 (N.D. Cal. 1908)).
91. Northern ill. Gas Co., 676 F2d at 272.
92. Id.
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argued that the amended complaint was untimely and failed to cure
the defect in the initial pleading.93
The United States court of appeals held that the defective
petition did not affect removal of the case under section 1446(b)
and the initial petition "contained the necessary factual information
regarding the AAAs nominal party status."94 The court upheld the
reasoning in 7yler stating that removal must be effected within
thirty days after a defendant receives a copy of the complaint or is
served with process, whichever occurs first.95
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Pochiro v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,96 upheld the
decision that service of process is not required for the removal
period to begin under section 1446(b).97 The plaintiffs filed suit in
state court and delivered a courtesy copy of the complaint to
outside counsel for Prudential Insurance Company ("Prudential")
on November 30, 1984.98 Prudential was formally served under state
law on December 6, 1984.9 On January 3, 1985, twenty-nine days
after formal service and thirty-four days after receipt by outside
counsel, Prudential filed a petition for removal under section
1446(b). 100 The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand
and found the petition timely.'01 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued
that the motion to remove was untimely due to receipt of the
complaint by outside counsel for Prudential thirty-four days prior
to the motion.
10 2
The Ninth Circuit rejected this assertion on the basis that outside
counsel for Prudential was not authorized to accept service of
process for its client in the Pochiro action.103 Therefore, the initial
delivery of a courtesy copy of the complaint to counsel for
93. Id.
94. Id. at 274.
95. Id. The court provided minimal analysis to support their interpretation of section
1446(b) that service of process is not required prior to the period for removal beginning
under the statute. Id.
96. 827 F.2d at 1246.
97. Id. at 1247.
98. See Responsive Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand at 1,
Pochiro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., No. Civ. 85-11 (D. Ariz. filed Feb. 4, 1985).
99. Pochiro, 827 F.2d at 1249.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1248.
102. Id.
103. Id. The "complaint was delivered to the law firm that was counsel of record for
Prudential" for the earlier state court proceeding. Id. However, the firm was not specifically
authorized by defendants to receive process in this proceeding and the plaintiffs failed to
show otherwise. Id. at 1248-49.
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Prudential did not satisfy the requirement of "receipt" under section
1446(b). The Pochiros did not claim that Prudential received a copy
of the complaint prior to December 2, 1984, which was the thirtieth
day prior to the filing of a petition for removal. 104 The court,
through this line of reasoning, implicitly affirmed the logic that
receipt of the complaint unattended by formal service begins the
time period for removal under section 1446(b). 105
In another appellate court decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Roe v. O'Donohue°6 held that
service of process is not required to begin the time period for
removal under section 1446(b). 10 7 Roe brought suit in state court
against the Red Cross and others alleging that he received the
human immunodeficiency virus from a blood transfusion. 08 A
deputy sheriff served the complaint and summons on the Red
Cross at their headquarters by leaving the papers with a
receptionist on February 19, 1991.0 9 The employee of the Red
Cross who was authorized to receive the papers on behalf of the
organization claimed they did not reach him until February 22,
1991.110 On March 25, 1991, the Red Cross filed a notice to remove
the case to federal court,"' representing that the other defendants
did not object to the removal." 2
In holding that the removal by Red Cross was untimely, the court
re-affirmed the position that receipt of the complaint is sufficient to
begin the time period for removal under section 1446(b). 113 The
court in O'Donohue recognized that Northern Illinois Gas and
Pochiro provide oblique references and do not adequately address
the requirement of service of process prior to the time for removal
under section 1446(b)." 4 The court found no persuasive legislative
104. Pochiro, 827 E2d at 1248-49.
105. Id.
106. 38 F3d 298 (7th Cir. 1994).
107. O'Donohue, 827 F.2d at 302-03.
108. Id. at 300.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The notice was timely if measured from when the employee of the Red Cross
received the papers on February 22, 1991, but not if measured from when the sheriff left the
papers with the receptionist on February 19, 1991. Id.
112. O'Donohue, 38 F.3d at 300. The Red Cross based removal upon a federal-question.
Id. A claim within the federal-question jurisdiction may only be removed under 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b). Id.
113. Id. at 303. "Once the defendant possesses a copy of the complaint, it must decide
promptly in which court it wants to proceed." Id.
114. Id. "Although 'or otherwise' was added to the statute in 1949, see 63 Stat. 101,
ours is only the second appellate decision on the subject. See Tech Hills II Assoc. v. Phoenix
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history that would lead them not to follow the language of the
statute in interpreting that mere receipt unattended by formal
service is sufficient. '15 The court reasoned that the clear legislative
intent to require a copy of the initial pleading in conjunction with
the phrase "or otherwise," emphasizes the link between possessing
a copy of the pleadings and the time for removal."'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Reece
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc."7 followed the reasoning of O'Donohue and
held that service of process is not an absolute requirement prior to
the period for removal beginning under section 1446(b). 18 Reece
filed a claim in state court against Wal-Mart and one of their
employees." 9 Reece's attorney promptly mailed a courtesy copy of
the petition with a cover letter to Wal-Mart's chief executive
officer. 20 Reece did not formally serve Wal-Mart under local law
until two months after receipt of the courtesy copy.12' Wal-Mart
then filed a motion to remove the 'case to federal court.
122
The court in Reece held the receipt of the initial pleading through
any means, not just service of process, begins the thirty day period
for removal under section 1446(b).l2 The court held that the statute
is the sole repository of congressional intent, if the statute is clear
and does not demand an absurd result.2 4 Further, the court found
the plain meaning of the statute unambiguous and consistent with
Congress's intent to swiftly resolve removal issues.' 25 The court
recognized potential abuse, but contended that the courts have the
power to review exceptional circumstances on a case by case basis
to prevent such abuses.' 26 In the present case the court concluded
Home Mutual Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 963, 966-68 (6th Cir.1993). (Oblique references in Northern
Illinois Gas, 676 F.2d at 273 n. 1, and Pochiro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 827 F.2d 1246,
1248-49 (9th Cir.1987), do not really tackle the question.)" O'Donohue, 38 E3d at 303.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 98 F3d 839 (5th. Cir. 1996).
118. Reece, 98 F.3d at 843-44.
119. Id. at 841.
120. Id. The cover letter suggested that parties communicate to negotiate a settlement.
Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Wal-Mart additionally asserted in the notice of removal that Reece had
fraudulently joined their employee Dennie Ashley in the suit to obtain diversity jurisdiction.
Id.
123. Reece, 98 F.3d at 841. The court cited both O'Dohohue and Tech Hills II Assocs. v.
Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. in support of this holding. Reece, 98 F3d at 841.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 841-42.
126. Id. at 842.
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that receipt by an officer of the company satisfied the "receipt"
requirement of section 1446 and provided notice of the substance
of the case prior to a decision on removal.
1 27
The minority view, prior to the Supreme Court decision in
Murphy Brothers, termed the "proper service" rule,128 is embodied
by the decision in Love v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. 129 from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia.' 30 In Love, the plaintiffs filed an action
in state court on March 19, 1982.131 On the same day, counsel for
the plaintiffs sent a copy of the complaint with a cover letter to
State Farm's regional office in Florida.132 It is unclear when the
plaintiffs properly served State Farm with process, if ever.'1 State
Farm filed for removal to federal court on May 17, 1982.134
The court in Love upheld the requirement that service of process
is required to start the removal period under section 1446(b). 135 The
court recognized the discrepancies and difficulties of many district
courts in interpreting the requirement of process prior to the
commencement of the removal period.136 The court in Love,
however, relied upon the history of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and the
intent of Congress in enacting the legislation.1 37 The court noted
that prior to 1948,13s a removal petition was a responsive pleading
in state court subject to the rules and limitations of that court.'
3 9
The court pointed to the intent of Congress in enacting section
1446(b) as an attempt to provide for a more uniform removal
procedure.' 40 The court highlighted the dilemma in New York after
127. Reece, 98 F3d. at 843.
128. Kluksdahl, 886 F. Supp. at 538.
129. 542 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
130. Love, 542 F. Supp. at 67-68.
131. Id. at 66.
132. Id. The cover letter from plaintiff's attorney to State Farm specifically noted that
plaintiffs were not attempting to serve State Farm at that time. Id. at 66 n.1.
133. Id. at 66. However, the lower court did find that proper service of process upon
defendants had not been obtained as of thirty days prior to State Farm's petition for removal.
Id.
134. Id.
135. Love, 542 F. Supp. at 67.
136. Id. The court cites Tyjler as an example of the difficulties. Id. The court further
recognizes that the Ty/ler decision relied heavily upon this courts earlier decision in
Perimeter Lighting, Inc. v. Karlton. Love, 542 F Supp. at 67 n.2. See Perimeter Lighting, Inc.
v. Karlton, 456 F Supp. 355 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
137. Love, 542 F Supp. at 67.
138. The year of the enactment of 28 U.S.C. 1446(b).
139. Love, 542 F Supp. at 67.
140. Id. at 67-68. The court cited 62 Stat. 939 (1948) in support of this position. Id.
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the enactment, where service of process could be accomplished
prior to the defendant receiving a copy of the pleading. 141 The court
concluded that Congress's amendment of the statute in 1949 was in
direct response to the New York Rule by allowing removal "within
twenty (now thirty) days after receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading."42 The court
held that it could not, have been the intent of Congress to
circumvent the already existing requirement of personal service by
the informal receipt of a copy of the pleading.'4
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York in Estate of Baratt v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.'44
followed the reasoning of Love in holding that service of process is
a prerequisite to commencement of the removal period. 45 On
December 9, 1991, plaintiff served process on a receptionist for
Phoenix Mutual Insurance. 146 The service was not proper under
New York law; however, plaintiff argued that even if the service
was improper, the time period for removal under section 1446(b)
should have begun with receipt of the complaint.147 The district
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument and held that service of
process is required prior to the removal period beginning.'4
The court relied upon the language of the statute and intent of
Congress in enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) in holding that proper
service is a prerequisite to commencement of the removal period.
149
The court asserted that Congress added the "or otherwise"
language to section 1446(b) in order to extend the removal period
in jurisdictions which allow plaintiff to commence a lawsuit
without filing a complaint. 50 The court pointed to the revision
notes of the 1949 Act interpreting the intent of Congress as trying
"to protect the right of removal while simultaneously preserving
141. Id. at 68.
142. Id. The court notes," See H.R.Rep.No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
(1949) U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1254, 1258." Id.
143. Id.
144. 787 F. Supp. at 333.
145. Baratt, 787 F. Supp. at 336.
146. Id. at 334. The process server stated that the Phoenix Mutual Life employee he
served stated that she was an officer manager and an authorized agent to receive service. Id.
The Phoenix employee testified that she had never stated to be an authorized agent and
further did not know the meaning of the term. Id. at 334-35.
147. Id. at 334.
148. Id. at 336.
149. Id. (citing Love in support of this position).
150. Baratt, 787 F Supp. at 336.
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adherence to State service requirements."15 '
In Apache Nitrogen Products, Inc. v. Harbor Insurance Co. et
al.,'52 Apache, the owner of an explosives manufacturing facility,
was under investigation for alleged violations of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA).' Apache demanded coverage from eighteen liability
insurers in connection with the investigation and potential
violations of CERCLA. 154 Apache filed suit in Arizona state court
seeking declaratory relief and damages after the insurers repeatedly
refused Apache's demands for coverage. 155 Courtesy copies of the
complaint were sent to several of the defendants with an attached
letter from counsel for Apache. 15 6 Notice of removal was filed more
than thirty days after receipt of the initial courtesy copy of the
complaint and was challenged as being untimely under section
1446(b).
15 7
The Apache court, in analyzing the requirements of section
1446(b), attempted to discern the intent of Congress through the
legislative history and subsequent amendment to the rule.' S* The
court found that the language "service or otherwise" was added in
1949 to cure a defect in the application of the statute due to the
local requirements of service of process in some states. 159 In some
states, the court reasoned, an action could be commenced through
service of process upon the defendant without the defendant ever
receiving a copy of the complaint.16° The court held that in order to
ensure that the defendant would receive the complaint prior to the
removal period beginning, the words "or otherwise" were added to
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) to encompass states that did not require receipt
151. Id. at 337.
152. 145 F.R.D. 674 (D. Ariz. 1993).
153. Apache, 145 F.R.D. at 675.
154. Id. Apache began making claims for coverage in relation to the environmental
investigation in 1987 up until filing suit on July 31, 1992. Id. at 675.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 675-76. The Apache court recognized the dilemma faced by the insurers to
remove the case immediately or to await service of process. Id. at 677. "Lacking foresight
into which of the two approaches [to the necessity of service of process], this Court would
follow, both Stonewall and Continental prudently chose not to risk their right to remove by
awaiting service." Id.
157. Id. at 676. The effect of receipt of a courtesy copy of the compaint was crucial to
the court's review of a default judgment entered against the defendants for failing to answer
a removed action within 20 days as prescribed by Rule 81(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. at 677.




of complaint for commencement of an action.161 The court
recognized that the use of the "plain meaning" of the statute could
lead to a multitude of interpretations and lead to conflicting
decisions relating to implementation of the statute.162
The United States District Court for South Carolina in Bowman
v. Weeks Marine, Inc.,163 agreed with the reasoning that service of
process is a prerequisite to commencement of the removal
period. 1"4 In Bowman, the plaintiff attempted to serve Weeks
Marine, an out of state corporation, with summons and a copy of
the complaint by certified mail on March 27, 1996.165 On May 13,
1996, defendant filed a notice of removal and an answer, but
reserved the right to contest the personal jurisdiction of the federal
court.166 Plaintiffs contested removal, claiming that the defendant
failed to remove the case within the thirty day removal period
provided by section 1446(b).
167
The district court, in a lengthy opinion, held that proper service
is a prerequisite to commencement of the removal period under
section 1446(b).l 6s The court relied on the due process problems
and widespread confusion in determining "receipt" in rejecting the
receipt rule. 169 The court examined the decisions in O'Donohue and
other receipt rule cases in identifying the critical problems with the
-receipt rule.170 The court pointed to the problems in defining the
words "receipt," and "or otherwise," as well as the difficulty in
determining what constitutes a "copy of the initial pleading" under
that section 1446(b).' 71 The court listed the potential problems may
arise in interpreting the phrases "receipt . . . or otherwise" and
"copy of the initial pleading."' 72
161. Id.
162. Id. at 679. "But this conclusion begs the question: if in fact the words 'service or
otherwise' had a plain meaning, the cases would not be so hopelessly split over their proper
interpretation." Id.
163. 936 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C. 1996).
164. Bowman, 936 F. Supp. at 329.
165. Id. at 331. The letter was received by a receptionist of defendant at their offices
out of state and verifies she received the letter but later "state[d]: 'I am not a corporate
officer of Weeks Marine, Inc., and I am not authorized to accept service of suit papers.'" Id.
166. Id. Defendants claimed they were never properly served under local law,
therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction in the matter. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 343.
169. Bowman, 936 F. Supp. at 333.
170. Id. at 333-38.
171. Id. at 338.
172. Id. at 339. Id. at 339. Regarding the interpretation of "receipt . or otherwise,"
the court listed the following eight questions and included citations to cases discussing the
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The court also illustrated the inequity of the receipt rule in
situations where defendants may receive a copy of the complaint
and may have to make removal decisions even if the plaintiff may
not proceed further with service of process.7 3 The court reasoned,
"[tihis provides a trap for the unwary or trusting defendant."' 74
In support of the "proper service rule," the court pointed to
service of process as the "bright line test which traditionally has
been the foundation for commencement of an action and which
provides the defendant the requisite due process notice that the
action has commenced." 75 The court stated that the requirement of
service of process clearly defines the commencement of the
removal period and provides a well-defined body of state law to the
court for guidance. 176 The court concluded that a more logical
approach is to rely on the established law regarding service of
issues:
(1) What is receipt?,
(2) Is receipt by facsimile valid?,
(3) Does receipt by E-mail constitute receipt?,
(4) Who is authorized to receive for a corporation, an agency, a partnership?,
(5) How do defendants, who have the burden of proving removal was justified,
disprove the negative that they did not receive a copy of the initial pleading?.,
(6) Can an attorney who has represented a client in the past receive for the client if
the client later decides to once again retain the same counsel?,
(7) Does a certified copy of a summons and complaint received by insurance carrier,
but not the insured, constitute receipt?,
(8) Is there such a thing as constructive, as opposed to actual, receipt?
Id. (citations omitted). Regarding the interpretation of "copy of the initial pleading," the
court listed the following six questions and included citations to cases discussing the issues:
(1) Is a conformed copy of a complaint an initial pleading?,
(2) Is an unconformed courtesy copy of the complaint an initial pleading?.,
(3) Are draft pleadings, sample pleadings or courtesy copies of proposed pleadings,
which are mailed, faxed or E-mailed to a defendant, but which have not yet been filed
in state court, initial pleadings?,
(4) Is a summons without a complaint an initial pleading?,
(5) Is a complaint that has not been filed, but is accompanied by a letter in which the
plaintiff's attorney states she will be filing the case in the immediate future
(tomorrow, next week, next month) an initial pleading?,
(6) When does the period commence if a comformed complaint is faxed to a
secretary at a corporation, who five days later delivers it to her boss, who is a senior
manager, but who is not authorized to receive service for the corporation, and the
plaintiff later joins additional defendants?
Id. (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 339-40.
174. Bowman, 936 F Supp. at 340.
175. Id.
176. Id. "Under the Erie doctrine, a federal court can easily look to state statutes and
case law and readily determine the triggering event commencing the thirty-day removal
period." Id.
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process than having to "reinvent the wheel by attempting to define
the not so plain and unambiguous 'or otherwise' language of
section 1446(b)."
17
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Murphy
Brothers v. Michetti Pipe Stringing settled a long standing dispute
related to the necessity of formal service of process for the
removal period to begin under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Since the 1949
revision to the statute adding the phrase "through service or
otherwise," courts have struggled to determine the requirements
intended by Congress to begin the time limitation for the removal
of an action from state to federal court. The difficulty courts
encountered in applying the statute flowed from the apparent
discrepancy between the broad plain meaning of the statute and
the intent of Congress in enacting the legislation plus the
fundamental requirement of service of process to initiate suit in the
United States of America.78
In interpreting the plain meaning of the statute, service of
process is not required for the time period for removal to begin to
run. The plain meaning of the language of the statute, "[tihe notice
of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within
thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of "179 the complaint or amended pleading,
does not result in a strict requirement for service of process prior
to the beginning of the removal period under the statute. The
phrase "through service or otherwise," when analyzed by the plain
meaning alone, leaves little doubt that other methods of receipt of
the complaint, whatever they may be, are sufficient to begin the
tolling period under the statute.
Irrespective of the plain meaning of the statute, the Court
decided the issue based upon the legislative intent and history in
enacting the statute and the fundamental requirement of service of
process. The statute was enacted and later amended to allow for
defendants to receive a copy of the complaint prior to the tolling of
the removal period. s° Discrepancies in state law forced Congress to
177. Id. The court further discusses the legislative intent of Congress in enacting and
amending section 1446(b) and supports the position presented in Love. Id. at 340-41.
178. Reece, 98 F.3d at 841; O'Donohue, 38 F3d at 303; Bowman, 936 F. Supp. at 333-41;
Apache, 145 FR.D. at 678; Estate of Baratt, 787 F Supp. at 336-37; Tyler, 524 F Supp. at
1212; Love, 542 F Supp at 67; Potter v. McCauley, 186 F Supp. at 147.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
180. H.R. 352, 81st Cong. § 1 (1949). A function of the amendment was to ensure that
tolling of the statute does not begin until the defendant has a copy of the pleadings. Id. If
the plaintiff effects service without delivering a copy of the pleadings, as allowed in some
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amend the statute to ensure the defendant would receive a copy of
the complaint, in order to allow the defendant sufficient time to
determine if the action was even removable.1 81 The statute was
never intended to usurp the long-standing requirement for service
of process.
Absent a clearer intent or response from Congress, the Court
correctly addressed what should be a requirement for any action
where a named defendant is directed to respond. If Congress had a
different intent in enacting the legislation, forty years was more
than adequate to address its intentions and clear the confusion
created in the judicial system by the simple phrase "or otherwise."
D. T-oy Blair
states in 1949, the defendant would be able to adequately determine whether the case is
removable. Id.
181. Id. In 1949, at the time of the revision to the statute, in certain states under local
law a lawsuit could be initiated without the defendant ever receiving a copy of the
complaint. Id.

